

THE BITS BETWEEN THE BITS

ILLUSTRIOUS 2011

Nicholas Jackson

Easter 2011

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Error correcting codes, sphere packings and abstract algebra.

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- **T M Thompson**, *From Error-Correcting Codes Through Sphere Packings To Simple Groups*, Carus Mathematical Monographs 21, Mathematical Association of America (1983)
- **J H Conway, N J A Sloane**, *Sphere Packings, Lattices and Groups*, third edition, Grundlehren der Mathematischen Wissenschaften 290, Springer (1999)

*Then five minutes, fingers crossed,
hoping not to witness the terror
of "R: Tape Loading Error"*

– M J Hibbett, *Hey Hey 16K*

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*Two weekends in a row I came in and found that all my
stuff had been dumped and nothing was done. I was really
aroused and annoyed because I wanted those answers and
two weekends had been lost. And so I said 'Damn it, if
the machine can detect an error, why can't it locate the
position of the error and correct it?'*

– Richard W Hamming

PROBLEM

Reliable storage of data on fallible media






PROBLEM

Reliable storage of data on fallible media



Reliable transmission of data over a noisy channel



THEOREM (NOISY CHANNEL CODING THEOREM)

- 1 For every discrete memoryless channel, the channel capacity

$$C = \max_{p_X} I(X; Y)$$

has the property that for any $\epsilon > 0$ and $R < C$, for large enough N , there exists a code of length N and rate $\geq R$, and a decoding algorithm, such that the maximal probability of block error is $< \epsilon$

- 2 If a probability of bit error p_b is acceptable, rates of up to

$$R(p_b) = \frac{C}{1 - H_2(p_b)}$$


are achievable.

- 3 For any p_b , rates greater than $R(p_b)$ are not achievable

SHANNON'S THEOREM

THEOREM (PARAPHRASE)

Information can be communicated over a noisy channel at a nonzero rate with arbitrarily small error probability.



Binary channel: Data transmitted as streams of 1s and 0s.
Most of what we want to store or transmit isn't like this, so encode it using a collection of **codewords**, such as a **character set**.

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Decode at the other end by splitting up into eight-bit chunks and reversing the encoding process.

TRANSMISSION ERROR

But suppose something goes wrong in transmission.

01001000 01000101 01001100 01001100 01001111 = HELLO

TRANSMISSION ERROR

But suppose something goes wrong in transmission.

01101000 01000101 00001100 01001100 01001011 = DE?LK

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BETTER ANSWER

Design an even cleverer coding scheme so that we can tell what the message should have been.

NAÏVE BUT VALID APPROACH

SSeenndd eeaacchh ccooddeewwoorrrd ttwwiiccee

If one letter/codeword in a given pair doesn't agree with the other one, then we know an error has occurred.

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CLEVERER BUT STILL NAÏVE APPROACH

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Assuming we've tweaked transmission rate so that the error probability is small enough, then we can detect **and correct** single errors.

HELLO \rightarrow HHHEEELLLLLLOOO \rightarrow HDHEEELL?LLLKOO

Now use a majority voting algorithm (FPTP!) to correct the error:

HDH	\rightarrow	H
EEE	\rightarrow	E
LL?	\rightarrow	L
LLL	\rightarrow	L
KOO	\rightarrow	O

This works, but it's not a very efficient way of doing things. We have to transmit three bits of data for every bit of actual information.

$$\text{Rate} = \frac{\text{message bits}}{\text{total bits}}$$

In general we'll talk about (n, r) codes: n total bits, r message bits.

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We expect a certain amount of trade-off for the security of error-correction, but surely we can do better than this?

BETTER APPROACH (ERROR DETECTION)

Turn 8-bit codewords into 9-bit codewords by adding a **parity check bit** at the end, so that the total number of 1s is even.

(This is like check digits in credit card numbers and ISBNs.)

PARITY CHECK

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We can detect single bit errors in any codeword: if the parity is wrong then we know the message has been corrupted during transmission.

The rate of this code is $\frac{8}{9} \approx 0.889$.


HAMMING'S (7, 4) CODE \mathcal{H}_7

Richard Hamming devised a (7, 4) code \mathcal{H}_7 with rate $\frac{4}{7} \approx 0.571$.
Each codeword has three parity bits and four message bits:

$P_1 P_2 D_1 P_3 D_2 D_3 D_4$

and each message bit is checked by at least two of the parity bits:

P_1	checks	D_1	D_2	D_4
P_2	checks	D_2	D_3	D_4
P_3	checks	D_1	D_3	D_4




Choose P_1 , P_2 and P_3 so that each circle has an even number of 1s.

HAMMING'S (7,4) CODE \mathcal{H}_7

\mathcal{H}_7 can detect and correct a single bit error in any codeword:

1101 \rightarrow 1010101 \rightarrow 1010101



$$P_1 = 1$$


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
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
\mathcal{H}_7 is one of a family of codes like this.

Use four overlapping spheres to get \mathcal{H}_{15} , the Hamming code with parameters (15, 11) and rate $\frac{11}{15} \approx 0.733$.

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
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Practical tradeoff: longer codewords impact on coding/decoding efficiency.

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
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I didn't believe that you could patent a bunch of mathematical formulas. I said they couldn't. They said "Watch us." They were right. And since then I have known that I have a very weak understanding of patent laws because, regularly, things that you shouldn't be able to patent – it's outrageous – you can patent.

1949: Marcel Golay discovers a **perfect** 3-error-correcting binary code \mathcal{C}_{23} with parameters $(23, 12)$ and rate $\frac{12}{23} \approx 0.522$.

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1979–1981: Voyager 1 and 2 used C_{24} , a modified 24-bit version of this code (with an extra parity bit) to transmit pictures of Jupiter and Saturn.




- BCH (Bose–Chaudhuri–Hocquenghem) codes: cyclic polynomial codes over finite fields (1959–1960).
- Reed–Solomon codes (1960). Used in CDs, DVDs, DSL, RAID 6, etc.
- Convolutional codes.
- Low-Density Parity Check codes (1960).
- Turbo codes (1993).

APPARENTLY UNRELATED PROBLEM

What is the most optimal way of packing together (hyper)spheres in n -dimensional Euclidean space \mathbb{R}^n ?

Considered by Kepler (1611), Lagrange (1773) and Gauss (1831)




SPHERE PACKING

Consider **regular** or **lattice** packings of spheres with same radius.

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
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


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
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
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PACKING RADIUS Half the minimal distance between lattice points.

\mathbb{Z}^n : the n -dimensional cubic lattice



Density	$\frac{V_n}{2^n}$
Packing radius	$\frac{1}{2}$
Kissing number	$2n$

$$V_n = \frac{\pi^{n/2}}{(n/2)!} \text{ (volume of } n\text{-dimensional ball)}$$

Family of lattices based on the A_n root system.

Density	$\frac{V_n}{\sqrt{2^n(n+1)}}$
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A_n LATTICES


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A_2




hexagonal

A_3




face-centred cubic



rhombic dodecahedron


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- Kepler (1611): A_3 (face-centred cubic) packing is the densest three-dimensional sphere packing.




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


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


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
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
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
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- Greengrocers nonplussed.

D_n : the n -dimensional **chessboard lattice**.


Points of \mathbb{Z}^n whose coordinates add up to an even number.

Density $\frac{V_n}{\sqrt{2^{-(n+2)}}}$

Packing radius $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}$


Kissing number $2n(n-1)$

- D_2 is \mathbb{Z}^2 (scaled by $\sqrt{2}$ and rotated)
- D_3 is A_3 (face-centred cubic)
- Voronoi cell of D_4 is a 24-cell



D_n^+ is two copies of D_n interleaved.

- D_2^+ is \mathbb{Z}^2
- D_3^+ is the molecular structure of diamond



- D_4^+ is \mathbb{Z}^4
- D_8^+ is E_8 (one of a finite series with E_6 and E_7)

Dimension	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Density	\mathbb{Z}	A_2	A_3	D_4	D_5	E_6	E_7	E_8
Kissing number	\mathbb{Z}	A_2	A_3	D_4	D_5	E_6	E_7	E_8
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Kissing number	P_{12a}	Λ_{16}	Λ_{24}
	840	4320	196560

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This is a sphere-packing problem on a 2^n -vertex, n -dimensional hypercube.

CONSTRUCTION A

Choose a linear binary code \mathcal{C} with parameters (n, r) .

(A code is **linear** if the sum, modulo 2, of any two codewords is also a codeword.)

A point (x_1, \dots, x_n) in \mathbb{Z}^n is a lattice point if the least significant bits (the 1s columns) of the numbers x_1, \dots, x_n give a codeword of \mathcal{C} .

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- \mathcal{H}_8 (\mathcal{H}_7 with an extra parity bit) gives $E_8 = D_8^+$.

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- The $(8, 1)$ repetition code gives the lattice $E_8 = D_8^+$.
- \mathcal{C}_{24} gives an interesting 24-dimensional lattice. Slot together two copies of this to get Λ_{24} , the **Leech lattice**.

THE LEECH LATTICE Λ_{24}

- Discovered in 1964 by John Leech (and independently by Ernst Witt in 1940).
- Densest 24-dimensional lattice (density = $\frac{\pi^{12}}{12!} \approx 0.00193$).
Densest regular packing; no non-regular packing can be more than 1.65×10^{-30} denser.
- Voronoi cell is a 24-dimensional polytope (hyper-polyhedron) with 16 969 680 faces.
- Related (via vertex algebras and conformal field theory) to string theory.
- Can also be constructed as the product of three copies of E_8 .
(And in many other ways: qv **J H Conway**, **N J A Sloane**, *Twenty-three constructions for the Leech lattice*, chapter 24 of SPLAG.)

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- ($*$ is commutative: can ignore order, so $g * h = h * g$)

EXAMPLES

CYCLIC GROUPS

$\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, \dots, n-1\}$ with modulo- n addition.

$+_n$	0	1	2	3
0	0	1	2	3
1	1	2	3	0
2	2	3	0	1
3	3	0	1	2

KLEIN 4-GROUP

*	e	a	b	c
e	e	a	b	c
a	a	e	c	b
b	b	c	e	a
c	c	b	a	e


See also “Finite Simple Group of Order 2”.

Mainly interested in the underlying structure (**isomorphism**)

SYMMETRIES

Symmetries of geometric objects are a rich source of interesting group structures. Also, groups are a good way of describing symmetry.

DIHEDRAL GROUPS



	e	r_+	r_-	m_1	m_2	m_3
e	e	r_+	r_-	m_1	m_2	m_3
r_+	r_+	r_-	e	m_2	m_3	m_1
r_-	r_-	e	r_+	m_3	m_1	m_2
m_1	m_1	m_3	m_2	e	r_-	r_+
m_2	m_2	m_1	m_3	r_+	e	r_-
m_3	m_3	m_2	m_1	r_-	r_+	e

- Elements are “ways you can flip a triangle round”
- Multiplication operation is “do one after another”
- Nonabelian group (commutativity fails)

SUBGROUP A smaller group embedded inside a larger one.

	e	r_+	r_-	m_1	m_2	m_3
e	e	r_+	r_-	m_1	m_2	m_3
r_+	r_+	r_-	e	m_2	m_3	m_1
r_-	r_-	e	r_+	m_3	m_1	m_2
m_1	m_1	m_3	m_2	e	r_-	r_+
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m_3	m_3	m_2	m_1	r_-	r_+	e

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r_-	r_-	e	r_+	m_3	m_1	m_2
m_1	m_1	m_3	m_2	e	r_-	r_+
m_2	m_2	m_1	m_3	r_+	e	r_-
m_3	m_3	m_2	m_1	r_-	r_+	e

NORMAL SUBGROUP Special sort of subgroup: can decompose larger groups nicely as a product of normal subgroups (qv prime factorisation of integers)

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r_-	r_-	e	r_+	m_3	m_1	m_2
m_1	m_1	m_3	m_2	e	r_-	r_+
m_2	m_2	m_1	m_3	r_+	e	r_-
m_3	m_3	m_2	m_1	r_-	r_+	e

NORMAL SUBGROUP Special sort of subgroup: can decompose larger groups nicely as a product of normal subgroups (qv prime factorisation of integers)

SIMPLE GROUP A group with no proper, nontrivial normal subgroups (qv prime numbers)

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- ① \mathbb{Z}_p where p is prime
- ② A_n where $n \geq 5$
- ③ a finite group of Lie type
- ④ one of 26 others (**sporadic groups**)

Group	Order	Group	Order	Group	Order
M_{11}	7920	M_{12}	95040	M_{22}	443520
M_{23}	10200960	M_{24}	244823040	J_1	175560
J_2	604800	J_3	50232960	J_4	$\approx 8.68 \times 10^{19}$
Fi_{22}	$\approx 6.46 \times 10^{13}$	Fi_{23}	$\approx 4.09 \times 10^{18}$	Fi_{24}	$\approx 1.26 \times 10^{24}$
Co_1	$\approx 4.16 \times 10^{18}$	Co_2	$\approx 4.23 \times 10^{13}$	Co_3	$\approx 4.96 \times 10^{11}$
HS	44352000	McL	898128000	He	4030387200
Ru	$\approx 1.46 \times 10^{11}$	Suz	$\approx 4.48 \times 10^{11}$	$O'N$	$\approx 4.61 \times 10^{11}$
HN	$\approx 2.73 \times 10^{14}$	Ly	$\approx 5.18 \times 10^{16}$	Th	$\approx 9.07 \times 10^{16}$
B	$\approx 4.15 \times 10^{33}$	M	$\approx 8.08 \times 10^{53}$		

THE SYMMETRY GROUP OF Λ_{24}

Leech suspected that the symmetry group of his lattice Λ_{24} might contain some interesting simple groups.

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Conway sets aside 6 hours on Wednesday afternoons and 12 hours on Saturdays to solve the problem. . . and finishes just after midnight on the first Saturday, having calculated the structure of the symmetry group Co_0 , and found three new sporadic groups Co_1 , Co_2 and Co_3 .