

THE SECOND BOMBING OF
COVENTRY

Our City Under the Nuclear Bomb



A Coventry Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Pamphlet
Forty years after the Coventry blitz 14 November 1940

15p

WILLIAM WILSON (Member of Parliament for Coventry South East),
LIL SMITH (Transport & General Workers' Union convenor, GEC Stoke
and chairman No. 5 Regional Committee, T&GWU) and Canon KENYON
WRIGHT (Director of the Centre for International Reconciliation,
Coventry Cathedral and Co-ordinator of the Coventry 80 Programme)
write:

This pamphlet is published to mark the fortieth anniversary of
the Nazi bombing raid on Coventry of 14 November 1940, and of
the suffering and destruction which we experienced then.

Since then, Coventry has been rebuilt and has grown in a spirit
of peaceful reconciliation and of social progress.

This pamphlet shows how Coventry today is menaced by nuclear
weapons of infinitely greater destructive power than the high
explosives used in 1940. If Coventry were attacked with nuclear
weapons, no one would be left to rebuild it.

It shows, too, how Britain's own nuclear weapons threaten a
similar fate to other cities and other peoples across Europe,
and how these weapons could become a reason for war.

Everyone who knows Coventry, who lives in it, who shares in it
should read this pamphlet.

WILLIAM WILSON

LIL SMITH

KENYON WRIGHT

THE SECOND BOMBING OF COVENTRY:

Written in 1980 by Mark Harrison, a member of Coventry CND, who
lives in Hillfields, Coventry and lectures in Economics at the
University of Warwick. Layout by Mark Harrison. First printed
in August 1980. Reprinted in September 1980 by Bizzicards,
Waveley Road, Coventry. Published by Coventry CND, 2 Lime Tree
Avenue, Tile Hill, Coventry.

INTRODUCTION

The first bombing:

"Coventration"

On the night of 14 November 1940 the city of Coventry was attacked by German bombers. During ten hours of heavy bombing the city centre was fired and gutted, and one third of the city's houses irreparably damaged. Its lines of communication and transport were broken or blocked. Hundreds of shops were closed down. Twenty one major factories, including twelve aircraft industry plants, were damaged by fire or by high explosives. 554 people were killed and 865 badly injured.

In the hours and days after the raid many shocked survivors fled the city into the surrounding villages and countryside. Government observers reported their common feeling to be: 'Coventry is finished', 'Coventry is dead'. The air raid gave a new word to many languages of the world - to 'Coventrate', meaning to bomb an entire community out of existence.

In fact Coventry was not destroyed. Nearly all its citizens had survived. Their housing and amenities had been fired, but so had their courage. Their factories' roofs and windows had been blown in, but the machines and production lines still ran. Within weeks industrial output was back to normal. After the war Coventry was rebuilt on its original bedrock of engineering skills and capital, now combined with new council housing, socialised health care, municipal schools and social services. The community had been changed by the bombing, but it had not been bombed out of existence.

Should world war break out again, Coventry will not survive a second bombing. It will be destroyed utterly,

and there will be no second rebirth from out of the ashes. In 1940 hundreds of tons of high explosives and fire-bombs fell on the city, and they killed one fifth of one per cent of the city's pre-war population. Tomorrow's war would bring down upon us weapons whose power is measured in thousands of tons ('kilotons') and even millions of tons ('megatons') of ordinary high explosive. Nearly everyone would die.

What is special about the nuclear bomb?

Ordinary high explosives are deadly. But in order to kill the largest possible number of people they must be used with great skill and concentration. The German bomber crews who flew against Britain were never so effective. 'Only' 60 thousand Britons died from bombing in six years of war with Germany. It was the British and American bomber commands which developed the technique to its highest level. By the end of the war in 1945 they had learnt how to kill tens of thousands, even a hundred thousand civilians in single, massive raids on single cities like Hamburg and Dresden in Germany or Tokyo in Japan.

They did this by mixing high explosives and fire-bombs in such a way as to create 'firestorms', engulfing whole cities in uncontrollable blazes. But to create a firestorm was difficult, often requiring several attempts and failures. It was also costly in terms of aircraft and aircrew at risk, and in terms of tons of bombs needed.

The perfection of the atomic bomb in 1945 changed all this. The single atomic bomb which fell from an American bomber on Hiroshima in Japan on 6 August 1945 had an explosive power of about

20 thousand tons (20 kilotons) of TNT. It killed at least 75 thousand civilians in the blast and the following hours. Its radioactive aftermath killed another 100 thousand in the following months and years. A similar bomb which fell on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945 killed about 40 thousand immediately, and more tens of thousands later.

Today's nuclear weapons designed for long-range bombing are delivered by rocket, not by aircraft. The smallest of them, deployed by the United States, is of the same explosive power as the Hiroshima bomb (20 kilotons). The largest, deployed by the Soviet Union, is over a thousand times as powerful (25 megatons). Both great powers have thousands of strategic nuclear weapons of intermediate size (from 500 kilotons to 5 megatons). Between them they command several tens of thousands of nuclear bombs, enough to kill the whole world's population several times over.

The nuclear bomb is different from all other weapons because it is inherently a weapon of mass destruction, and cannot be anything else. Other weapons can also cause mass destruction, whether they are conventional bombs, or even catapults and slings. But this depends on how such lesser weapons are used, and in what quantity. The special feature of nuclear weapons is that, no matter how small they are, no matter how they are used, they will always cause massive damage to civilian populations, to their productive powers and their amenities, and to their environment. Unlike other weapons nuclear weapons cannot be used selectively, in order to avoid indiscriminate civilian casualties and suffering.

This is equally true of 'tactical' nuclear weapons, which are mostly just as powerful as strategic nuclear bombs, but are designed to kill mainly Poles, Germans and Britons, rather than Russians and Americans. It is even true of the smallest 'battlefield' nuclear weapons like the neutron bomb, which are designed for use in multi-kiloton clusters. NATO's own exercises have shown that any use of nuclear weapons in a future war,

no matter how limited, will inevitably result in civilian destruction on an immense scale, far greater than the significance of any imaginable military objective. The late Lord Mountbatten, former Chief of the British Defence Staff, reflected this view when he said in a speech on 11 May 1979:

" As a military man who has given half a century of active service, I say in all sincerity that the nuclear arms race has no military purpose. Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. "

What then are nuclear weapons for? They cannot be used to conquer or to defend. If used by an aggressive power, they destroy the territory and wealth which is to be conquered. If used in defence against aggression, they destroy the land and people being defended in order to save them. For example, if either the Eastern or the Western powers used their nuclear weapons to conquer or to defend West Germany, West Germany would be destroyed in the process.

Nuclear weapons cannot be used to make free or to liberate, they cannot be used to bring about national independence or equality, they cannot be used to spread socialism or to restore capitalism. Nuclear weapons have only one purpose. It is a political purpose rather than a strictly military one. Because they are so unimaginably destructive, they can be used to terrorise and to paralyse the will of the opponent (in military jargon, to 'deter'). This was the reason for their first use against the people of Japan in 1945, and it is the reason why they continue to exist today.

Will there be a nuclear war?

Too many people have assumed for too long that, because nuclear weapons are so terrible, they will never be used again. They are wrong. Nuclear war is possible. There would be no winners, yet neither side would be able to hold back from mutual destruction.

This is because nuclear weapons have themselves become a reason for war.

The world today is in danger of nuclear destruction, because nuclear weapons do not just frighten and deter the 'enemy' from using their nuclear weapons. They can also provoke the 'enemy' into using their nuclear weapons against our nuclear weapons, and they can in turn tempt 'our' military planners into finding ways of using our nuclear weapons first.

For many years both East and West have tried to build up the scale of their strategic nuclear rocket forces in order to be able, should they wish, to destroy the opponent's nuclear weapons before they could be used. They have also tried to adapt their nuclear weapons to military purposes by making them smaller and more accurate. They have watched each other go about these things, and have redoubled their own efforts in these directions. Both sides are to blame for this state of affairs. But it should be pointed out that the United States developed the atomic bomb first. Moreover NATO's policies of 'forward defence' and 'flexible response' mean that NATO has retained the option of being the first to use nuclear weapons on any future European battlefield.

Increasingly nuclear weapons deployed by one side do not deter their use by the opponent. The opposite is more and more the case. They are an increasing provocation to nuclear attack, and an increasing temptation to those who possess them to use them first. NATO claims that its new 'cruise' missiles and Pershing 2 rockets must be deployed in Britain in order to deter the Warsaw Pact from using its new SS-20 missiles. The Warsaw Pact planners say that the SS-20 is a defence against NATO's nuclear missile submarines and naval aircraft. The Soviet military 'threat' is a mirror held up to our own threatening 'defences'. NATO's new missiles are just as likely to provoke an attack on Britain as to prevent one. They are a reason for war, not just a means of fighting.

If a European or world war broke out, the British Isles would become a massive nuclear target. In addition to the part played by our own armed forces within NATO, Britain has been given three other important roles. Firstly, Britain is a great 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' for United States nuclear bombers and air-bases. Shortly mobile missile launchers will be added to these, to be dispersed over the country in times of crisis. Secondly, Britain must defend West European airspace against long-range bombers striking from over the North Atlantic - NATO's 'back door'. Thirdly Britain would become a giant staging area for the reinforcement and resupply of NATO's fighting forces in Europe, especially from the United States. At the same time Britain would be expected to bring its own war-making capacity to bear.


In such a war, each side would concentrate on destroying its opponent's ability to fight. In the process Coventry would also become a target. Just as it was in 1940, Coventry is still an important centre of production of aircraft components, electronic equipment, armoured vehicles and motors, and machine tools. It is surrounded by other economic and military targets.

Below the effects of a nuclear attack on Coventry are described. It is assumed that the attacker would be the Soviet Union, but this does not mean that the Soviet Union would start the war or cause it. Coventry would not be the only loser; we should be just as concerned about 'our' nuclear weapons and their effects on the citizens of Dresden or Volgograd, Coventry's twin cities.

Previous studies of the effects of nuclear weapons (see the Coventry Evening Telegraph for 18 March 1980, or the Guardian for 24 April 1980) have often focused upon quite large explosions in the two-to-ten megaton range. For Coventry such bombs are unrealistically large, especially given the trend for nuclear weapons to get smaller. A bomb of relatively low yield would be quite sufficient to wipe our city off the map.

THREE CASES

A one-megaton explosion over Coventry



There are three ways in which Coventry might realistically suffer the effects of a nuclear attack. Each one is considered in detail in the following pages. Case 1 is the bombardment of the city with a single nuclear weapon of average size. Case 2 is a bombardment with six much smaller weapons aimed at the city's key economic installations of possible military significance. Case 3 is incidental damage to the city resulting from bombardment of a nearby target with a moderately large nuclear bomb.

Case 1. A single bomb over Coventry

The average size of nuclear warhead in the Soviet strategic rocket arsenal is

just over one megaton. It is plausible to imagine the delivery of a single one-megaton warhead onto the city, perhaps by an SS-11 intercontinental ballistic missile, belonging to a numerous class of Soviet rockets with appropriate range and payload. The purpose of such a strike would be simply to destroy the city, and a larger warhead would not be necessary for this. The strike might be a demonstration, or the carrying out of a threat. Alternatively it might be an incidental part of a massive Soviet retaliation against some other act of global war. In order to achieve the greatest extent of general destruction the bomb is exploded at about 8,000 feet directly over the Rolls-Royce factory on Parkside.

The map shows two rings centred over the factory (marked by the number 1). The inner ring has a radius of four fifths

of a mile, and includes the city centre, shopping precinct and cathedral, extending in other directions as far as the Butts, the Whitley waste reduction unit and the edge of the Highfield Road football ground. Above the centre is a fireball nearly 1½ miles wide. At the edge of the ring the blast causes an excess over the normal atmospheric pressure (called 'overpressure') of 20 pounds per square inch and winds of nearly 500 miles per hour. Everyone within the inner ring is killed three times - by crushing under the overpressure, by burns and by the effects of 'gamma' radiation. In addition to 100 per cent fatalities, all housing and even the reinforced concrete structures of the shopping precinct and elevated ring road are flattened.

The outer ring has a radius from the centre of 3 miles. At its edge the atmospheric overpressure is down to a peak of 10 pounds per square inch, and the wind speed peaks at nearly 300 miles per hour. Between the inner and outer rings everyone suffers lung damage and burst eardrums from the blast. Everyone suffers damage from gamma radiation. People in the open suffer third-degree burns which char the skin. Most people in the open are killed anyway by the wind which sweeps them into lethal collisions with other objects, combined with other injuries. Most people indoors are killed anyway as glass shatters and buildings collapse, on top of other injuries. All housing is destroyed or irreparably damaged, and all streets are blocked with wreckage.

The area inside this outer ring covers the whole of the city north to the M6, east to Ryton, south almost to Kenilworth and west beyond Tile Hill and Allesley. To make matters worse, about 1½ miles out from the city centre fires begin to burn and extend out to the edges of the city and beyond. Between the inner and outer rings fatalities run at between 90 and 98 per cent. Only beyond the outer ring do we begin to find significant numbers of survivors, most of them injured and many of them trapped.

Some people in the city might previously


have undertaken measures of Civil Defence such as preparing emergency supplies for themselves and their families, whitewashing windows and preparing a domestic fallout shelter. In the outskirts of the city such measures would provide a little protection against the heat flash, and against being injured during the collapse of buildings. All survivors would regardless have suffered internal injuries from the crushing overpressure, and from the most penetrating radiations. If such people had been given warning in time to take shelter, if they were not trapped by collapsed masonry, and if a firestorm did not develop, they would survive the next few days.

If the destruction of Coventry was an isolated act, other communities would come to the survivors' assistance. If the destruction was general, those who had been neither incapacitated nor trapped would emerge into a radioactive world without medical care, energy or water supplies, with poisoned crops and foodstores, polluted by the dead. The measures of Civil Defence undertaken by the survivors would have won them the right to suffer a little longer before dying unnoticed and unremembered.

Case 2. Six smaller bombs on economic targets

A Soviet objective might not be to destroy the city, but to destroy its economic capacity to sustain war industries. In this case it is realistic to expect the delivery of several quite small strategic nuclear warheads onto particular targets pinpointed within the city. Such an event would only take place during an all-out war with general nuclear exchanges. It would make sense if Soviet military planners believed - correctly or otherwise - that the targets chosen had already been given some protection against relatively distant nuclear blasts by means of reinforced concrete hardening. They could only be knocked out by relatively precise direct hits.

Six 100-kiloton explosions over economic targets



The example shows the effects of exploding six 100-kiloton warheads, the smallest in the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, delivered by two SS-20 medium-range ballistic missiles from the Western USSR, each with three independently targetable warheads. The bombs could be exploded either in the air (above about 1,100 feet) or lower, in which case the fireballs would make contact with the ground itself and would technically be described as 'groundbursts' - with slightly different results. According to the former US Presidential aide McGeorge Bundy a United States strike against only military targets would place some 60 nuclear warheads on the city of Moscow alone, so an allocation of six small weapons to an important industrial centre like Coventry seems not unrealistic.

Compared to the one-megaton bomb these six warheads would be more difficult to place accurately and their total mega-

tonnage would be less (600 kilotons, or six tenths of a megaton). But they would be spread widely over the city. The map shows six small rings centred on 1. Rolls-Royce (Parkside), 2. Talbot (Stoke), 3. GEC (Stoke), 4. BL Jaguar, 5. BL Alvis, 6. BL Rover-Triumph. Each small inner ring has a radius of one fifth of a mile. At the edge of the inner ring, for explosions in the air, the peak overpressure is 20 pounds per square inch, and the wind speed peaks at nearly 500 miles per hour. Within the rings everyone is killed instantly and all structures are flattened. These effects correspond to the effects within the inner ring for the one-megaton airburst weapon.

The middle rings have a radius from each explosion of 0.65 miles (1,150 yards). The targets are so spaced that each of these middle rings just touches at least one other at its rim. Their combined area covers the centre of the city and extensive surroundings,

including much of the north and west of the city's suburbs. At its edge the peak atmospheric overpressure is 10 pounds per square inch and the wind speed peaks at nearly 300 miles per hour. Everyone suffers lung damage and burst eardrums from atmospheric crushing, but these injuries are incidental because everyone is simultaneously killed by burns and by gamma radiation. All structures within the middle rings, including those of reinforced concrete, are flattened.

The outer set of rings covers all the rest of the city except for parts of Bell Green, Wyken, Willenhall, Cheylesmore, Stivichall, Cannon Park and Allesley. Each outer ring has a radius of one and 3 tenths miles around the nearest explosion. At the edge the peak overpressure is down to 3 pounds per square inch, the peak wind speed a mere 95 miles per hour. Most people are relatively unaffected by the crushing blast wave, although housing is irreparably damaged and the streets blocked by debris. Most people in the streets are killed or injured by the violent wind, by third-degree burns and by gamma radiation. Most people indoors are trapped or injured by the effects of the blast on housing or factories. In addition the area from the middle to well beyond the outer rings will be the main fire zone.

Perhaps a third of the people between the middle and outer rings are killed and a third injured by the initial explosion. The remainder face the hazards of entrapment, fire and a ravaged environment. They will receive no aid, since war is certainly going on elsewhere, and may easily return to the city to finish the survivors off.

A case could be made for the six bombs to be exploded on the ground rather than above their targets. Accurate airbursts will destroy reinforced concrete structures like buildings and bridges, but not relatively small installations like individual machines or communicating and computing facilities. These can be sheltered to survive extreme overpressures of 1,000-3,000 pounds per

square inch. Such extremely 'hard' targets can only be destroyed by engulfing them in the nuclear fireball itself. If Soviet military planners believed such targets to be present, they would prime their six 100-kiloton warheads to explode below 1,100 feet in order to bring the fireballs into contact with the ground.

At very short ranges this would intensify the effects of each explosion. The smallest circles on the map would now represent craters with pulverised soil and wreckage piled around them, two fifths of a mile across. Within them every structure, object and living thing would have been vapourised. Beyond the craters out to the middle rings the blast effects would be slightly reduced, but everyone would still die of burns, gamma radiation and injuries caused by broken glass and collapsing masonry. Inside the outer rings some housing would only be moderately damaged, and some streets would be passable with difficulty. The bulk of the population would still lie casualty to a combination of burns, radiological damage and other injuries, and would still lie within the main fire zone extending a little way beyond the outer ring.

Thus the initial effects of groundburst weapons on the surrounding civilian population are a little less severe. However groundburst weapons add a new hazard which follows shortly, silently and inevitably. Tons of ground particles have been vapourised, sucked up and fiercely irradiated within the nuclear fireball. Now they drift back to earth as radioactive fallout.

Each bomb would contaminate two to three square miles around the explosion with enough fallout to kill most people even in protective domestic shelters in terraced houses. Each bomb would create enough fallout to kill most people caught in the open for 100 square miles around. Such an attack would only make sense as part of an unrestrained nuclear war, and this means there would be no clean environment elsewhere, free of radioactivity, for the survivors to flee to.

Case 3. A larger bomb over a target near Coventry

The Soviet objective might not be Coventry at all, but a nearby target of military significance. This would be a likely event in the first stages of any war involving nuclear weapons. Given Britain's important role in the air defence and air supply of NATO territory, we could imagine a nuclear strike on Elmdon airport, just ten miles away. Another tempting target would be created by Britain's own strategic nuclear weapons system - the Very Low Frequency radio transmitter at Rugby, used to communicate with Britain's nuclear missile submarines while they are submerged on patrol, also just ten miles distant from Coventry.

In either case part of the attack might consist of small, accurately placed nuclear weapons. However there would also be a role for larger bombs. In the case of Elmdon airport a larger bomb would ensure the destruction of aircraft and supplies on the ground and flying many miles away. In the case of the Rugby VLF transmitter, a larger bomb would disrupt telecommunications transmissions and equipment over a wide area. So we could imagine the effects on Coventry of a relatively large 5-megaton bomb - still many times smaller than the largest weapons - delivered by an SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missile and programmed to explode in the air at a distance of ten miles.

In this case Coventry would be spared immediate annihilation. The line representing a maximum atmospheric overpressure of 3 pounds per square inch would pass by the city centre, 10 miles from the point of the burst. Winds of up to 100 miles per hour would sweep across the city. People caught in the open would suffer second-degree burns blistering the skin, and would be swept by the wind into collisions with other objects, many of them lethal.

Damage to housing would range from severe in the quarter of the city nearer the blast, to moderate in the more distant suburbs. The whole city, however, would form part of the main fire zone. If the target was Elmdon airport, our city would be one link in a chain of fire circling Birmingham, running from Coventry to Lichfield in the north, to Kings Norton in the south, and all the way round the shattered heart of the West Midlands to West Bromwich.

The effects on Coventry of gamma radiation and of radioactive fallout would not be great (unless groundburst explosions also accompanied the attack). Even so the blast alone would leave perhaps 5 per cent of the city's population dead, and another 45 per cent injured. The city would be on fire. When the flames had nothing left to burn, the city would be a ruin in a world of ruins.

This study used the following sources of information:

- Angus Calder, *The People's War: Britain 1939-1945* (London: Panther 1971)
- John Cox, *Overkill: The Story of Modern Weapons* (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1977)
- Defence in the 1980s, Vol. I (London: HMSO 1980)
- The Effects of Nuclear War* (Montclair-London: Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment 1980)
- Peter Laurie, *Beneath the City Streets* (Revised edition, London: Panther 1979)
- Col. Gen. N.A. Lomov, ed., *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs* (Moscow 1973, trans. and publ. by the USAF)
- The Military Balance 1979-1980* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979)
- Nuclear Weapons* (London: HMSO 1974)
- Tactical Nuclear Weapons: European Perspectives* (London: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 1978)

CONCLUSION

Lessons for the people of Coventry

The next war will not be like the last war. Coventry would not survive an attack using nuclear weapons.

Even if Coventry were not attacked directly, the city would be destroyed as a community. If Coventry were attacked directly, almost every one of us would die.

Government spokesmen claim that, in a nuclear war, some people would die and some would be injured, but some would

survive. The survivors must be protected through Civil Defence so that they can go on to win the war and rebuild the world after the war.

This propaganda is designed to make us believe that nuclear war is an acceptable means of national policy.

It is a lie. We, the people of Coventry, have a tradition of seeking peace and friendship between cities and peoples. We can help to expose this lie.

Firstly:

If Coventry is attacked with nuclear weapons, no matter how 'small' or 'selective' they are, our city will cease to exist. Hardly anyone will survive. Most people will die. Coventry will not be rebuilt.

Secondly:

British and NATO nuclear weapons threaten the existence of millions of civilians and their cities in Eastern Europe. This murderous threat does not add to our own safety. It is as much a reason for war, as a way of preventing it.

Thirdly:

Nuclear weapons do not defend us or help us to survive. They are a further inducement to go to war; they add to the causes of military tension between the superpower alliances. Britain has nuclear weapons, and we should throw them away.

Fourthly:

We, the people of Coventry, should join with the citizens of the world for peace. We should work with our brothers and sisters across Europe against the nuclear militarists to make Europe a nuclear-free zone, as a prelude to world disarmament.

" Nuclear war is not a comfortable subject ... A militarily plausible nuclear attack, even 'limited', could be expected to kill people and to inflict damage on a scale unprecedented in American experience; a large-scale nuclear exchange would be a calamity unprecedented in human history. The mind recoils from the effort to foresee the details of such a calamity, and from the careful explanation of the unavoidable uncertainties as to whether people would die from blast damage, from fallout radiation, or from starvation during the following winter. But the fact remains that nuclear war is possible, and the possibility of nuclear war has formed part of the foundation of international politics ... ever since nuclear weapons were used in 1945. " (The Effects of Nuclear War, Congress of the United States/Office of Technology Assessment 1980)

" First there was a ball of fire changing in a few seconds to purple clouds and flames boiling and swirling upwards. Flash observed just after aircraft rolled out of turn. All agreed light was intensely bright. Entire city except outermost ends of dock areas covered with a dark grey dust layer which joined the cloud column. It was extremely turbulent with flashes of fire visible in the dust. One observer stated it looked as though whole town was being torn apart. " (USAF report of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945)

" I have no idea how long it was before I came to ... In the dim light coming through the mouth of the shelter I saw a huddle of half naked people stream about the entrance way. Their bodies were puffed up like balloons, their skin was peeling off in strips, hanging down like the shreds of a rag. They were so still that I thought they were dead, but they weren't; they kept moaning, 'Water, give me water!' " " After a few minutes I saw something coming up the road along the river that looked like a parade of roast chickens. Some of them kept asking for water ... I would rather blind myself than ever have to see such a sight again. " (Accounts of Takasi and Makoto Nagai, survivors of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki on 9 August 1945)

COVENTRY CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Subscription rate : £1.00 per year (unwaged : 50p)

Name : I would like to receive further information

Address : I would like a speaker for my organisation

I enclose a year's subscription of £

Telephone : I enclose a donation of £ to cover costs

Please return this form to Coventry Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 2 Lime Tree Avenue, Tile Hill, Coventry

