Recent debates on extending externalism to conscious experience via reducing its phenomenal character to its representational, externally individuated, content (inter alia, Lycan 2001, Dretske 1995, Tye 2000) or endorsing the sensorimotor contingency theory of perception (O’Regan & Noë 2001, Noë 2004) prima facie raise an important challenge to the search for NCC methodology, because conscious experience may not be seen as locally supervenient on neural processes in the brain (Noë & Thompson 2004, Hurley & Noë 2003). In this paper, I critically argue that the two strategies fail to jeopardize the search for NCC, because they do not succeed in establishing a sound external localization thesis for the vehicles of conscious experience. I also constructively argue that internalism about both the content and vehicles of consciousness is a satisfactory position, compatible with the search for NCC methodology, and I endorse a form of routine epistemic artifact-recruiting externalism with respect to cognitive architecture as the sole plausible form of externalism.